The
common historical and cultural past of the two countries and the
economic difficulties they both faced after the collapse of the
Soviet Union have pushed them to stay close. The first step to
their strongest alliance was made in 1992 with the creation of a
common customs union which was the base of the Union's future
treaties between the two countries in 1997 and 1999. This project
of Union was developed during the following years, according to the
relations evolution between the two countries. During the 1990s we
assisted to a quick rapprochement process but it started to be
immobilized in the 2000s and to have ended in a serious break-off
with the oil and gas incidents in 2006 and 2010. However, as we
will see, this unification project between the two countries,
despite various problems, especially the ones linked with the
question of the energy prices and gas transit, is an answer to a
more fundamental political and economical game for both
countries.
Evolution of a historically long-term relation
For over two centuries Belarus and Russia have shared
a common history. We can single out two distinct periods of their
relations. The first, from 1795 to 1991, started with the Belarus
annexation to Russia after the defeat of Poland and finished with
the collapse of the Soviet Union. This era was characterized by the
Russian domination in all the domains during the Russian Empire
period, as well as during the Soviet Union existence. These strong
socioeconomic links which had been built for years between them,
associated to the failure of the Belarus economy to fully adopt the
capitalism at the end of the USSR, pushed the two countries to
strengthen their particular relations again through the Union
project. The main aim of this project is to build a mutually
beneficial and prosperous space. In fact, it appeared quickly that
Minsk, as well as Moscow, has more to take using this union project
on a political and geostrategic side than in the utopia of building
a better society together. The Russian Federation may use the
Union's advantage in many different areas. With the end of the Cold
war and the recent moves of the European Union, USA and the NATO to
the former Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, Minsk
still remains a very strong political ally in this region. The
geographically close position to Western Europe of Belarus
represents the main gate of access to Europe for Russia and an
interesting military strategic position. Regarding the field of the
organizations regrouping the former member-states of the USSR like
the CIS or EurAsEC, Moscow can count on the support of Minsk every
time to keep the leadership of these institutions.
For the
Belarus republic, this Union is a way to break the country's
international isolation by receiving a strong economic support from
Moscow via various subventions that include oil and gas supply at
special rates. On a more political point of view, the importance
Russia gives to a small country like Belarus and the unshakable
support from the Belarusian government, let the president
Lukashenko have some influence in the Russian political world. This
influence is used by him to stay in power in his country by giving
the illusion to the Belarusian people that they will have a better
future with this upcoming Union project. Whatever, even if both
countries gain some advantages to create this Union, it doesn't
mean they don't face difficulties and incomprehension between them.
We can even say that disputes are the main way of communication
between them.
Oil, gas pipelines, Customs union: the
eternal disagreements
The main recurrent subject of dispute between Moscow
and Minsk turn around the question of the gas transit and energy
prices. We can single out three main conflicts that have taken
place during these last 10 years.
The gas crisis of 2006
Until 2006, Belarus had been paying $47 per 1000m³ for its gas
(comparing to $250 for the rest of Europe) before Russia decided to
increase the price unilaterally. Minsk didn't want to hear about
any change of the current price the country was paying. As a
consequence, Moscow stopped the gas deliveries. This decision
forced Minsk to accept an agreement, the country accepted to pay
$100 per 1000m³ and gave 50% of the shares of the national
Belorussian oil and gas company Beltransgaz to Russia via
Gazprom.
The energetic crisis of 2007
One year later, in the middle of winter 2007, the Russian giant
Gazprom raised the prices of the Russian gas delivered in Belarus
again. Minsk refused and Russia cut the gas delivery for two days
until Belarus accepted the new prices.
The oil crisis in 2010
In January, the Russian
Federation temporarily cut the oil supply to Belarus following a
disagreement on oil prices for the current year. At the end of the
month, an agreement was reached until September. In May, the
Belarusian president Lukashenko made a proposal that Russia should
take the control of all Belarusian pipelines and, in exchange for
that, Moscow should accept to deliver oil to Minsk at the Russian
internal market prices. However, despite all these disputes, there
is no risk of a potential energetic conflict which can strongly
affect Europe like the previous one between Russia and Ukraine.
This is mainly because Belarus is only responsible for 20% of the
gas transit to Europe while Ukraine sees to 80% of the Russian gas
transiting by its pipeline networks, which is 40% of the European
consumption. This situation shows that Belarus doesn't have
leverage as strong as Ukraine does. Outside the energetic theme we
can highlight other major points of disagreements and disputes
between the two countries.
One relevant element is the recent efforts done by
Belorussia to break its isolation. Indeed, when Minsk tries to
build fair bilateral commercial relations with its "big brother",
Moscow seems to ignore it. As a consequence, this situation has
pushed Belarus to start diverting its diplomatic, politic and
economic relations. The country commenced regular relations with
other oil countries such as Venezuela or Libya. Minsk also
discretely tries to attempt reconciliation with the European Union.
All these opening signs irritated Moscow because for the Kremlin
that means a potential loss of control over its little Eastern
European ally. Another topic which decayed the Belarusian-Russian
relations turns around the recognition of the two separatist states
of the Georgian republic supported by Russia. Minsk still refuses
to accept Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. More
recently, it's the refusal of joining the new Customs Union uniting
Russia, Belarus and the Kazakh republic that offended Moscow. Since
then, the problem was solved even if some export duties
disagreements subsist. The Customs Union was concretely launched on
6th July, 2010.
Is a common future still possible
now?
The
Russian Federation and Belarus are predetermined to share their
future because they both need each other, Moscow for its
international strategic interests, and Belarusian president
Lukashenko to maintain his power in his country. Despite the
various and regular disputes between the two countries, the Russian
and Belarusian elites understood well the importance to keep and
preserve a close relationship. Obviously, on middle term, this
relation should evolve further in a concrete union. The first move
will be done in the economical, energetic and military field but it
will probably take much more time to see the creation of a common
political union, but, who knows?
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